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1.1	  	   Introduction	  
The European Union (EU) consists of 27 Member States which have surrendered part of their 
power to the politicians in Brussels. The EU affects trade, economics, energy, social policies, 
environment, consumer protection, research, foreign- and security policy, tourism, education, 
human rights and more within Europe; making a heavy impact on life in Europe and beyond.1 
Despite the immense importance of EU politics the citizens have not been eager to cast their 
votes. Since the first European Parliament (EP) election in 1979 with a turnout of 61.99% the 
turnout has steadily fallen for each election. Even though the EP is the only directly elected 
institution the participation in the latest election dropped to 43% in 2009.2 The declining 
turnouts have been explained as a result of several problems; the citizens are unaware of the 
benefits with the EU and the EU!s impact on the citizens! lives, citizens find the EU!s system 
complex and difficult to understand, citizens lack confidence in the EU and there is a feeling 
of disconnection between citizens and the EU. The EU recognizes that it needs to present 
improvements and strategies that are credible and show insight in current European issues in 
order to restore confidence and interest. In order to achieve policies with high quality and 
relevance the EU believes that increased and improved participation is necessary.3 
Developing policies that will strengthen the citizens! belief in the EU is a difficult task when 
citizens are unwilling to participate in the political process and make their voices heard. 
With a political system in need of input the majority of the citizens have turned away 
and lobbyists are replacing them. While the EU!s competences expanded throughout the years 
lobbying activity has grown in Brussels, a natural reaction to the EU!s increasing impact on 
European regulations. Claims that the institutions are lacking resources to keep up with the 
increasing assignments are likely to make the lobbyists! information and input even more 
valuable and important.4 Frequently quoted numbers estimates that there are about 15 000 
professional lobbyists in Brussels providing expert information and participating in the EU!s 
                                               
1 Europa, Gateway to the European Union, europa.eu/index_en.htm 
2 European Parliament, Results of the 2009 elections, 
www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/turnout_en.html 
3 Strategic objectives 2005-2009, COM(2005) 12 final, page 2, and European Governance: A White Paper, 
COM(2001)428 final, page 3. 
4 Coen, The evolution of the large firm as a political actor in the European Union, pages 94-95, European 
Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Lobbying in the European Union, pages 2-3, and European 
Parliament, Resolution on the development of the framework for the activities of interest representatives 
(lobbyists) in the European institutions, point A.  
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policy-making process.5 Lobbyists are supplying a part of the solution to better policies by 
contributing to the process with information, manpower and experts. To some extent they are 
also contributing with input from the citizens.6 However, lobbying is not an unquestioned 
activity and adds problems to the EU!s policy-making process. There have been reports of 
lobbyists using methods that are considered to be in conflict with the EU!s policy of openness 
and democratic standards. Serious doubts about the state and effect of EU lobbying were 
raised by claims and allegations that lobbyists were supplying misleading information, MEPs! 
assistants were accepting money from lobbyists and allegations were made that politicians 
were acting as interest representatives. There was also uncertainty about how accurately the 
citizens! concerns were being represented by the lobbyists.7   
The existence of questionable lobbying methods and the lack of confidence in the EU 
called for action. The White Paper on European Governance (WPG) was introduced in 2001 
and set out to improve governance, strengthen democratic values and restore faith in the EU 
and its system.8 Building on the WPG the European Transparency Initiative (ETI) was 
launched in 2005; the ETI improved the lobbying framework that was established by the 
WPG and resulted in the launch of the Transparency Register in June 2011.9 The 
Transparency Register is supposed to contribute to a transparent and democratic policy-
making process and increase the citizens! faith in the process and the EU. This leaves no room 
for improper lobbying.10 The question is, can a voluntary register with minimum standards 
guarantee a democratic process and restore confidence in the EU?  1.2	   Purpose	  
The purpose of this essay is to answer the question: is the Transparency Register enough to 
ensure democratically sound lobbying within the EU? To answer this question a set of 
democratic standards need to be established. These standards will be used to analyse if the 
Transparency Register complies with the EU!s democratic standards and if the regulation 
                                               
5 Corporate Europe Observatory, Brussels the EU Quarter, page 9, and European Parliament, EU lobbying under 
spotlight, www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20080414FCS26495 
6 Van Schendelen, More Machiavelli in Brussels, pages 331 and 340, Karr, Democracy and lobbying in the 
European Union, page 73. 
7 Green paper "  European Transparency Initiative, COM(2006) 194 final, pages 5-6, and European Parliament, 
Directorate-General for Research, Lobbying in the European Union, page 36. 
8 Harlow, Accountability in the European Union, page 53.  
9 Green paper "  European Transparency Initiative, COM(2006) 194 final, pages 3-4. 
10 Transparency Register, Why a transparency register?, europa.eu/transparency-register/about-
register/transparency-register/index_en.htm  
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encourages lobbying that complies with those standards. In the case that the regulation does 
not comply with democratic standards suggestions for improvement will be presented. The 
Transparency Register will also be compared with the USA!s federal lobbying regulation. 
This comparison will be used to supply concrete suggestions for an alternative method of 
regulating lobbying. 1.3	   Choice	  of	  subject	  
This essay belongs to the field of constitutional law. The EU!s Treaties will be the foundation 
for the democratic standards that the lobbying regulation will be compared to. Constitutional 
subjects such as transparency, equality of voice and accountability are all important aspects in 
this essay. The essay is juridical but will enclose literature from the field of political science 
which is closely connected to constitutional law. 1.4	   Method	  
In this essay classic judicial methodology, comparative analysis and critical method will be 
combined to answer the question at hand. The judicial methodology will be present 
throughout the entire essay. When analysing the Transparency Registers compliance with 
democratic standards the critical method will be used. Comparative analysis is used when 
comparing the EU!s Transparency Register with the USA!s lobbying regulation. The USA!s 
federal regulation was chosen as a comparison for several reasons. Of all the modern 
democracies, the USA has the longest history with regulation of lobbying. The American 
regulation began as state legislations and the first federal legislation was introduced in 1935. 
Today US federal lobbying laws are the most highly regulated at a national level.11 This 
makes the American lobbying regulation very different from the EU!s voluntary Transparency 
Register and a valuable example of an alternative method for regulating lobbying. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11 Chari et al, Regulating lobbying: a global comparison, pages 20 and 153. 
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2.1	   Lobbyists	  and	  lobbying	  
When using terms as lobbying and lobbyists it is important to be aware that there are several 
different definitions in research, literature and regulations.12 In this essay the term lobbyist is 
used for interchangeably with civil society, interest representatives and lobbying groups. Just 
like with the EU!s use of the words lobbyist and lobbying there is no implication made that 
lobbying is considered as an illegitimate or negative activity.13  
Lobbying can be defined as activities performed when someone seeks to affect the 
policy-making process to the represented interest!s advantage. Lobbyists can either seek to 
suggest regulation, prevent regulation or change regulation. Lobbying can take place from the 
outside by influencing decision-makers or from the inside by participating in committees or 
projects. This involves the entire policy process, from suggestion of legislation to 
implementation and enforcement. An important part of lobbying is monitoring the political 
process. Lobbyists that are well-informed about the political agenda can influence a proposed 
legislation from the start.14 The gathering of that information is preferably done indirectly and 
quietly to avoid alerting opponents. After the information is gathered the lobbyists can 
prepare their input which is usually supplied by providing information or support.15 	  2.2	   The	  need	  for	  lobbying	  
Considering the possible negative implications that surround lobbying, the earlier mentioned 
reports about improper lobbying and the public!s uncertainty about lobbying!s legitimacy one 
might wonder why it is not banned. In academic literature there are varying theories and 
opinions about lobbying, resulting in different approaches to lobbying. Pluralists, neo-
pluralists and neo-marxists all have different opinions of lobbying and the effects of lobbying. 
Another point of disagreement is whether or not lobbyists have equal opportunities to 
influence the political system. This generates multiple suggestions on how lobbying should be 
regulated, if at all. Currently there are several academics regarding lobbying as a legitimate 
activity that is beneficial to the political process in democracies.16 The lobbyists contribute to 
the policy-making process by providing input, feedback, expertise and support. Support in 
                                               
12 Chari et al, Regulating lobbying: a global comparison, page 3.  
13 Follow-up to the Green Paper #European Transparency Initiative!, COM(2007) 127 final, page 3. 
14 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Lobbying in the European Union, page iii, and 
European Parliament, Resolution on the development of the framework for the activities of interest 
representatives (lobbyists) in the European institutions, point B. 
15 Van Schendelen, More Machiavelli in Brussels, page 49. 
16 Chari, Regulating lobbying: a global comparison, pages 1-2. 
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forms of mobilizing voters or creating a public opinion can of course also be used as 
opposition to a proposed legislation that lobbyists do not want. Either way a public debate is 
created which gives the politicians a chance to show that they are not separated from their 
constituents and listens to them between elections. Certain lobbying groups can also provide 
legitimacy to the political system by showing that all interests and concerns are treated with 
respect by the system.17 The positive opinion about lobbying!s contribution to the policy-
making process is shared by the EU and lobbying is believed to be beneficial for the EU!s 
future.18 Improved European integration is believed to be an EU-specific positive effect. The 
interest groups can initiate co-operation with groups in other Member States and lobbying 
could spark public debates in the EU. This is believed to increase understanding between the 
Member States and thereby improve the forming of a European identity.19  2.3	   Negative	  effects	  of	  lobbying	  
There is a strong belief today that lobbying is needed in modern democracies and that 
lobbying has a positive effect on the policy-making process, but there are negative aspects of 
lobbying that some think should be addressed. The concern mentioned in chapter 1.1 
regarding the level of representativeness achieved by the lobbyists! input is a threat to trust 
and confidence in political systems.20 It is of course difficult to guarantee that lobbying takes 
all relevant interests into consideration but one solution would be to allow all interests to 
participate, leaving the balancing between different interests to the politicians and not to 
active lobbyists. Nevertheless there are concerns that lack of interference would give unfair 
advantages to business interest with vast resources.21 There are also examples of lobbyists 
trying to block other groups out of the policy-making process. This could lead to a system 
were certain interests would get an excessive amount of influence. These issues in 
combination with a disconnection between political systems and citizens could damage the 
democratic legitimacy of the system and its policy-making process.22 The informal measures 
                                               
17 Karr, Democracy and lobbying in the European Union, pages 43 and 72. 
18 High-level Working Group on a Common Register and Code of Conduct for Lobbyists, Joint statement 
regarding the progress achieved to date, page 3, European Governance: A White Paper, COM(2001)428 final, 
page 19, and European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Lobbying in the European Union, page 36. 
19 Van Schendelen, More Machiavelli in Brussels, page 340, and Green paper "  European Transparency 
Initiative, COM(2006) 194 final, page 5, Strategic objectives 2005-2009, COM (2005) 12 final, pages 4-5, and 
European Governance: A White Paper, COM(2001)428 final, page 14. 
20 Bertók, Lobbyists, governments and public trust, page 15. 
21 Karr, Democracy and lobbying in the European Union, page 172. 
22 Van Schendelen, More Machiavelli in Brussels, pages 334-335 and 340, and Karr, Democracy and lobbying in 
the European Union, page 171. 
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of lobbying can add to criticisms of lacking accountability and transparency in a political 
system. This can result in the public distrusting the policy-making process.23 Lobbying that 
crosses the line into illegal activities, such as bribery, makes the public question the actions of 
all the lobbyists and discredits both lobbying and the political system.  2.4	   Regulating	  lobbying	  
Since the EU has decided that lobbying is a legitimate activity that should be regulated this 
essay will focus on theories about how lobbying regulation should be formulated.24 The 
purpose of creating a lobbying regulation is usually not to guarantee that illegal activity will 
not take place; there are criminal laws forbidding bribery or extortion which will make it 
possible to punish those who cross the line. Instead the purpose of lobbying regulation is 
usually to create trust in the policy-making process and the role the lobbyists play in it. 
Through transparency the citizens can be made aware of what interests are behind proposals 
and what interactions there are between lobbyists and the political system. With transparent 
lobbying and public scrutiny the citizens are supposed to be assured that no one has improper 
amount of influence on the politicians.25 Throughout the world there are different approaches 
to lobbying regulation, at national-level there are everything from high to low regulated 
systems. In this essay both the high-regulated and the low-regulated system is represented, by 
the US and the EU solutions.26 Lobbying regulation usually results in the creation of a register 
meant to improve transparency of the lobbyists! actions. It also results in the politicians being 
accountable for their interactions with special interests. The register seldom affects which 
interests are strong and capable of influencing the policy-making process.27 In the case when 
increased integrity and changes in lobbyist behaviour is wanted a Code of Conduct can be 
established that clarifies accepted interactions for both politicians and lobbyists.28 The 
definition of lobbyists in the regulation usually focuses on professional lobbyists that are paid 
to influence but the definition can be made wider in order to address the public!s concern.29 
 
                                               
23 Karr, Democracy and lobbying in the European Union, page 172. 
24 Green paper "  European Transparency Initiative, COM(2006) 194 final, page 5. 
25 Chari et al, Regulating lobbying: a global comparison, pages 6 and 156-157, and Bertók, Lobbyists, 
governments and public trust, page 2. 
26 Chari et al, Regulating lobbying: a global comparison, page 109. 
27 Chari et al, Regulating lobbying: a global comparison, page 6. 
28 Bertók, Lobbyists, governments and public trust, page 16. 
29 Bertók, Lobbyists, governments and public trust, page 10. 
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3.1	   European	  democracy	  
Despite the fact that democracy is well-established in Europe there is no accepted definition 
or structure that defines what a democracy is or how it should function. The Member States 
have diverse democratic structures, traditions and history; making it difficult and sensitive to 
specify what a democracy is because it is necessary to give room for the Member States 
varying notions of democracy. Defining democratic principles and standards are made even 
more complicated by the fact that the terms are not written in stone and are often given 
different meanings by the EU as well as the academics.30 The terms transparency and 
openness are often used interchangeably by the EU and the terms will be used in the same 
way in this essay.  
The democratic debate regarding the EU is fairly young. Demands for improved 
democratic legitimacy were first heard in the 1990s and have resulted in progress regarding 
citizens! rights and democratic improvements of the EU!s organisation.31 There is no doubt 
that democracy is a fundamental principle of the EU. The Union!s values are founded on the 
respect for democracy and its functioning is based on representative democracy (TEU, articles 
2 and 10). The TEU does not specify what democracy is which is understandable considering 
the above mentioned difficulties. However, the state of democracy in the EU is often 
criticised and it is argued that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit; lacking in democratic 
principles such as transparency, accountability and legitimacy. The EU!s democratic state and 
development is further complicated by its position as a sui generis, a unique entity, with 
characteristics that make it different from national states. Therefore any democratic principles 
modelled on Member States must be applied with caution on the EU.32  
This essay will not aim to formulate a perfect or complete account of democratic 
principles and standards valid within the EU. The democratic principles and standards which 
lobbying needs to comply with will be based on statements from the Commission and the EP. 
This means that the Transparency Register and its Code of Conduct will be compared against 
goals and democratic standards that the EU itself has considered important for lobbying 
regulation. The WPG and the ETI are especially important sources because they have been 
vital for several of the processes that have resulted in a more democratic EU.  
                                               
30 Van Schendelen, More Machiavelli in Brussels, pages 320-321, and Harlow, Accountability in the European 
Union, page 7. 
31 von Bogandy, A disputed idea becomes law: remarks on European democracy as a legal principle, page 33. 
32 Eriksen and Fossum, Post-national integration, page 5 and von Bogandy, A disputed idea becomes law: 
remarks on European democracy as a legal principle, page 35. 
11 
 
3.2	   Democratic	  principles	  for	  lobbyists?	  
The WPG resulted in several improvements that enhanced the democratic quality of the 
policy-making process. The democratic initiatives and improvements were not confined to the 
EU!s organisation or people employed by the EU. The changes made for a more democratic 
EU would require efforts from civil society as well. Processes initiated by the WPG increased 
the possibilities to influence and participate in the EU!s policy-making process. According to 
the WPG better involvement meant that the lobbyists would have to accept greater 
responsibility. The Commission did not hesitate in demanding that civil society must follow 
principles of good governance and specifically mentioned the democratic principles of 
accountability and transparency. The ETI repeated the importance of lobbyists taking 
responsibility, openness regarding lobbying activities, public scrutiny and a wide range of 
stakeholders participating in the policy-making process.33 These are examples of the 
principles of transparency, participation and accountability that are valued as important to the 
process of making the EU more democratic.34 The statements in the WPG and the ETI make it 
clear that the EU is expecting the lobbyists to adhere to these democratic principles if they 
wish to influence the EU.  
The opinion that the political system and the lobbyists should share the responsibility 
for keeping interactions democratically sound is not unique for the EU. The argument is that 
if the lobbyists want lobbying to remain welcome and legitimate in the policy-making process 
they have to comply with democratic standards to ensure that citizens feel comfortable with 
the lobbyists! participation.35 Asking all those who participate in the policy-making process to 
contribute to rather than to undermine belief in the political system is logical and reasonable. 
The ETI identified two measures already in use that could help stimulate lobbying to comply 
with democratic principles. The external method focuses on enabling public scrutiny through 
transparency and making information about interactions between the EU and lobbyists 
publicly available. The internal measure establishes rules that control the behaviour of 
lobbyists and the people working for the EU.36 The Transparency Register uses both these 
measures as it has a Code of Conduct as well as a public register. The purpose of the register 
is to encourage legitimate lobbying, minimize the use of lobbying activities that are improper, 
                                               
33 European Governance: A White Paper, COM(2001)428 final, page 15, and Green paper "  European 
Transparency Initiative, COM(2006) 194 final, pages 2 and 4. 
34 European Governance: A White Paper, COM(2001)428 final, page 10. 
35 Bertók, Lobbyists, governments and public trust, pages 8-9. 
36 Green paper "  European Transparency Initiative, COM(2006) 194 final, page 6. 
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stimulate discussion about current political issues and involve more lobbyists and individuals 
in the policy-making process.37 3.3	   Transparency	  
Transparency is acknowledged as an important democratic principle within the EU and there 
have been several initiatives to enhance the EU!s transparency. Amongst the initiatives of the 
WPG was a process that aimed to achieve an open policy-making process within the EU.38 
This process is of course connected to the fact that all decisions within the EU should be taken 
as openly as possible (TEU, articles 1 and 10.3). The importance of openness does not only 
apply to decision-making, all work within the EU should be conducted as openly as possible 
which will $ensure the participation of civil society%  (TFEU, article 15). Transparency is 
considered to have several valuable and positive effects, it is said to create understanding for 
complicated systems and increase confidence in policy-making processes. The principle of 
transparency is a prerequisite for accountability, without knowledge about actions taken it is 
difficult to hold anyone accountable.39 With all these claimed beneficial aspects transparency 
has become an important part of the solution to the challenges facing the EU. Specifically the 
disinterest from citizens and lack of confidence in the system are problems that transparency 
could help to solve.40 The ETI, that resulted in the launch of the Transparency Register, 
specifically focused on enhancing transparency and the Commission has stated that the aim 
should be a $high level of transparency%  in order to achieve public scrutiny and openness 
within the EU.41  
In chapter 3.2 it was established that the lobbyists need to comply with the principle 
of transparency if they want to lobby the EU. Transparency is closely connected to lobbying 
because the institutions are supposed to have an open and transparent dialogue with lobbyists 
(TEU, article 11.2). The article is directed towards the institutions but if the EU!s dialogue 
between the two parties is supposed to be transparent this of course affects the way lobbying 
is conducted. Furthermore if the EU sees a need to improve transparency in their policy-
making process it is not unreasonable to expect the lobbyists to adapt to more transparency. 
                                               
37 European Governance: A White Paper, COM(2001)428 final, pages 15 and 33, Green paper "  European 
Transparency Initiative, COM(2006) 194 final, page 6. 
38 European Governance: A White Paper, COM(2001)428 final, page 3. 
39 Dyrberg, Peter, Accountability and Legitimacy: What is the Contribution of Transparency?, pages 82-83, and 
European Governance: A White Paper, COM(2001)428 final, pages 10-12. 
40 Neyer, Discourse and order in the EU, page 703. 
41 Green paper "  European Transparency Initiative, COM(2006) 194 final, pages 2. 
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Participation is a valued democratic principle but that does not mean that lobbyists have a 
right to influence the EU behind closed doors.  
The purpose of the Transparency Register is to increase transparency and openness 
about lobbying activities. According to the ETI public information is a prerequisite for public 
scrutiny, which would deter lobbyists from activities that are considered questionable or 
improper.42 Examples of information that would be beneficial for enabling public scrutiny are 
data that clarifies who is lobbying, how lobbying is performed, which interests are being 
represented and information about the funding of lobbying groups. Another purpose with 
increasing transparency through the Transparency Register is to provide a comprehensive 
$ landscape%  of lobbyists active within the EU. The width of the interests represented in the 
register would show that the EU receives input from a great variance of sources which would 
enhance confidence in the policy-making process.43 This purpose is best served if as many 
lobbyists as possible are registered. Ways of creating a comprehensive register, what 
information about lobbyists and their input should be made public in order to live up to a high 
level of transparency is discussed below. The ETI cautions against measures of transparency 
which are ineffective or disproportionate.44 This means that there should be a balance struck 
between the burden of information and the positive effects of the information.   3.3.1	   Information	  about	  lobbyists	  
It has been stated repeatedly that there is a need for the public and the EU to know who the 
lobbyists are, which interest they represent, what their mission or objective is and who is 
funding them. According to the Transparency Register!s website the citizens can get 
information about $who is engaged in activities aiming at influencing the EU decision-making 
process, which interest are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these 
activities% .45 Concerning financial disclosure the Commission has stated that it is $necessary 
and proportionate%  to ask for relevant budget numbers and separate disclosure of spending for 
larger clients or funding sources. The purpose of financial disclosure is to give the citizens 
and the EU information about the financial strength of various lobbyists. Requiring 
information about active lobbyists is justified according to the Commission because without 
                                               
42 Green paper "  European Transparency Initiative, COM(2006) 194 final, page 6. 
43 Follow-up to the Green Paper #European Transparency Initiative!, COM(2007) 127 final, page 3, and 
European Transparency Initiative: the register of interest representatives, one year after, COM(2009) 612 final, 
page 2. 
44 Green paper "  European Transparency Initiative, COM(2006) 194 final, page 5. 
45 Green paper "  European Transparency Initiative, COM(2006) 194 final, pages 5-6 and 8, and Transparency 
Register, Why a transparency register?, europa.eu/transparency-register/about-register/transparency-
register/index_en.htm 
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sufficient information about the lobbyists the value and relevance of their input cannot be 
assessed.46  
If the Transparency Register lives up to the goals and purposes established by the EU 
the register will provide information about who the lobbyists are, whom they are representing, 
what mission or objective they have for themselves or their clients, where the funding comes 
from and how much resources are used for lobbying. In the case of lobbyists representing 
several clients they should have to state separate spending for the larger clients. The required 
information needs to be balanced against the risk of demanding too much information. 
Excessive information demands could result in non-compliance and might damage the value 
of the information by overburdening the register.47 Public scrutiny should not be hampered by 
the register being overloaded with information or presenting information in an 
incomprehensible way. The Transparency Register should therefore refrain from requiring 
information that is unnecessary. This is important to keep in mind when formulating the 
articles regarding required information and designing the register. The register needs to 
supply citizens with relevant information that is easy to understand and compare.  3.3.2	   Input	  from	  lobbyists	  
The ETI stated that the public must know what input the lobbyists provide and it was 
suggested that it should be public which positions lobbyists take when lobbying the 
institutions.48 The possibility for public scrutiny is connected to the Regulation regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (Regulation 
regarding public access). When registering in the Transparency Register the lobbyists 
acknowledge that the EP and the Commission might have to grant the public access to 
documents or correspondence from the lobbyists.49 This is a less effective solution than 
information about activities in the Transparency Register because the lobbying contributions 
would be mixed with all sorts of documents held by the EU; it would be more difficult to get a 
clear overview of the participation of individual actors and would require more effort from the 
citizens. The Transparency Register requires information about lobbyists! activities that are 
                                               
46 Follow-up to the Green Paper #European Transparency Initiative!, COM(2007) 127 final, page 4. 
47 Bertók, Lobbyists, governments and public trust, page 10. 
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defined as $main legislative proposals covered in the preceding year% .50 This indicates that the 
public should be able to find out which initiatives that have been influence by specific 
lobbyists. That assumption is supported by the ETI suggesting that the Commission!s public 
consultations would benefit from more extensive information about which lobbyists have 
contributed to the development of certain policies.51 This statement is reminiscent of the EP!s 
suggestion of $ legislative footprint%  were those responsible for reports or legislative 
suggestions voluntarily attach lists of lobbyists that have contributed to the process.52 Even 
though these statements do not concern the Transparency Register it indicates a trend of 
increasing transparency regarding lobbyists! input in the policy-making process. With that 
background it is reasonable to expect that the Transparency Register provides information 
about which legislations that lobbyists! have been actively working on. 3.3.3	   Comprehensive	  register	  
When establishing a register for lobbyists the EU had a choice to make between voluntary and 
mandatory registration. The Commission continuously suggested a voluntary register with 
incentives to register. Initially the incentives amounted to automatic alerts from the EU on 
topics that the lobbyists have declared interest in. The EP on the other hand wanted a 
mandatory register.53 In discussions following the ETI the Commission was convinced that 
the proposed incentive of automatic alerts was not going to be an effective incentive, 
especially not for lobbyists in Brussels who pay close attention to the policy-making process. 
Nevertheless, it should not be underestimated that the automatic alerts can have a positive 
effect for lobbying groups that lack enough resources to follow the daily policy-making 
process. For the second incentive the Commission was inspired by its own consultation 
standards which demand that for contributions made through the Internet the source 
organisation must provide the public and the Commission with information about their 
objectives and organisation structure, otherwise the contribution will be considered as input 
from an individual. The incentive is to connect the Transparency Register with a new standard 
template for internet consultations. Lobbying organisations sending in contributions to the on-
line public consultations will be $systematically invited%  to register in the Transparency 
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Register.54 To summarize, in order to achieve a comprehensive register the Transparency 
Register should strive to reach a high registration rate. The easy solution for this would have 
been a mandatory register. However, it is possible that a voluntary approach in combination 
with incentives will be enough to claim that the Transparency Register is a $one-stop shop%  
where citizens can learn who is engaged in lobbying and influencing the EU.55 3.4	   Participation	  
Participation is believed to ensure relevance, quality and effectiveness of EU policies. These 
positive effects of participation are believed to increase confidence in the EU and its 
regulations. The principle of participation is enhanced by applying transparency measures, 
with information about current policy processes it is easier for lobbyists to get involved at an 
early stage. Because of the many positive impacts of participation the EU tries to increase the 
input and contributions from lobbyists.56 Amongst other things the EU conducts its work 
openly in order to stimulate the lobbyists! participation (TFEU, article 15). The ascribed 
positive effects of lobbyist! participation is a result of several impacts that the lobbyists have 
on policy-making processes. Participation between elections is assumed to give feedback to 
the system without the need of elections and the politicians could be alerted to issues that 
need addressing. When the lobbyists co-operate with interests organisations in other Member 
States in order to increase the weight of their contribution it is believed to further the 
European integration and identity. Lobbyists can also engage citizens in their lobbying which 
means that those citizens gain experience in being active during terms.57 EU!s positive 
approach to lobbyists participating in the policy-making process is related to the European 
citizens! right to participate in what is referred to as the EU!s democratic life (TEU, article 
10.3). This means that citizens! participation between elections is encouraged and valued 
within the EU and is proof of openness to input in order to improve the quality of EU 
regulations. There is also a close connection to the citizens! freedom to assembly or create 
associations to protect their interests (European Charter of Fundamental Rights, article 12). 
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According to the Commission the participation in associations representing interests is an 
example of how the citizens can engage in the EU!s political life.58  
As mentioned in chapter 2.3 the participation of lobbyists is appreciated but there are 
negative impacts of lobbying that can diminish the value of participation. There are risks that 
lobbyists already affecting the system try to block out other lobbyists, by creating coalitions 
or thresholds for rivals, in order to secure their own impact on the system. Another aspect is 
the concerns about well-funded lobbyists having a greater capability to respond to the EU!s 
need for information and therefore getting an excessive amount of influence.59 Certain groups 
also seem to have more problems with organising themselves and influencing the politics, 
increasing even further the gap between the capabilities of different lobbying groups. These 
inabilities often strike groups that are underrepresented, such as groups representing women!s 
rights or protection of the environment.60 On the other hand, the Commission and the EP 
distribute funds to groups that lobby the EU. The groups that receive the most are citizen 
organisations and youth or education groups. The funding has been questioned and the ETI 
initiated an improvement of information available about the funds. Studies have been done 
measuring perceived success of lobbying from both the politicians point of view and the 
lobbyists.61 For the purpose of this essay it is enough to know that there are discussions about 
how level the playing-field is and that the positive effect of participation would be diminished 
if it turned out that only a limited aspect of the interests managed to influence the policy-
making process.  3.4.1	   Level	  playing-­‐field	  
According to the EP equal access to the EU is $an absolute prerequisite%  for the EU!s 
legitimacy and the citizens! trust in the system. With a more level playing-field the sources of 
information available to the EU increases by giving more lobbyists the opportunity to 
influence the EU.62 The focus on a level-playing field is connected to the theory of equality of 
voice. Equality of voice refers to the right to be treated equally when participating in 
democratic life during terms. It means that there should be equal opportunities to influence the 
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political system and proportional representation on non-elected bodies.63 This is of course 
related to the principle of citizens! equality. The EU is bound by the TEU to give its citizens 
equal attention and this is valid no matter what action the EU is executing (TEU, article 9). 
The equality of voice is one of the foundational principles for the Transparency Register and 
binds the Commission and the EP to treat all lobbyists equal. This only applies when the 
lobbyists are $engaged in similar activities in a similar manner% .64 This means that the 
Transparency Register needs to be careful when regulating the lobbyists and demanding 
information, any differences made between lobbyists have to be carefully motivated. The 
regulation should also refrain from diminishing the variety of interests that seek to influence 
the EU. 3.5	  	   Accountability	  
The EU has on several occasions acknowledged accountability as an important democratic 
principle that will contribute to enhancing democracy within the EU.65 Typically the principle 
is described as democratic accountability which refers to politicians being held accountable 
by their constituents. Within the EU only the EP is elected directly by the citizens and the 
Council is held accountable by national governments or citizens (TEU, article 10.2). In terms 
of accountability the EU has been heavily criticised for a democratic deficit in this aspect, the 
means of holding the Council accountable is accused of being indirect and ineffective. The 
Commission cannot be held accountable at all but is at least more transparent than the Council 
which is accused of secrecy and decision-making behind closed doors.66 This critique is part 
of the reason why improved democratic standards are necessary within the EU and have 
contributed to the democratic developments initiated by the WPG and the ETI.  
As explained above in chapter 3.2 the EU has declared that lobbyists will have to 
accept more accountability and responsibility when they decide to influence the EU. The EU 
does not explain what is meant by accountability and responsibility for lobbyists. To argue 
that EU citizens should be able to punish lobbyists and remove them from their employment 
as lobbyist would be farfetched. The principle of accountability has developed several 
meanings over the years connecting the term with responsiveness, which refers to politicians 
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being motivated to consider the public!s concerns and wishes because of their 
accountability.67 But it is not reasonable to demand that lobbyists should take the entire 
society!s interest into consideration, the balance between conflicting interests should be struck 
by the politicians. The very purpose of lobbying is to represent interests and convey the 
interests! opinions in the policy-making process, no matter if the interest is held by the 
majority or the minority. Instead accountability for lobbyists should be understood in the light 
of accountability that is imposed on corporations when the EU establishes rules or standards 
for them, which means that lobbyists are going to be held accountable if they breach 
established rules or standards. The accountability for lobbyists is also reminiscent of 
professional accountability which refers to public servants accountability for the work they 
perform. Public servants often provide expert knowledge and information that is necessary to 
solve the complex political issues of today. The public servants are held accountable both by 
their superiors and their peers.68 There are clear similarities between professional 
accountability and the improvements suggested in the WPG and the ETI. Lobbyists have a 
similar function when they supply expertise information about complicated or technical 
issues. It is also important to stimulate scrutiny from other lobbyists due to the often complex 
political issues. The alternative would be that the EU would have to treat all input with 
caution and scepticism. Researching the accuracy of the information would be too costly and 
time-consuming. This would result in an ineffective policy-making process which would 
diminish the positive democratic impacts that participation from civil society has; such as 
presenting varying interests that improve the accuracy and effectiveness of EU laws and 
regulations.69 Simply put, lobbyists should be accountable for their input into the policy-
making process which is a reasonable and proportionate demand. 3.5.1	   Responsibilities	  and	  rules	  
Through the Transparency Register lobbyists supply the EU with information about 
themselves, the interest that is being represented, objectives of their lobbying and also their 
funding. Legitimate lobbying means supplying the register with information that is correct 
and not misleading. Since the lobbyists are providing the information it is natural to demand 
that they take responsibility for the accuracy of the content. It is also reasonable to demand 
that the lobbyists will be responsible for keeping their information in the Transparency 
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Register up-to-date, with the risk of being held accountable otherwise. This assumption is 
supported by the Commission that considers it the lobbyists! responsibility to $accurately and 
objectively%  calculate the numbers and describe the way they are funded. According to the 
Commission this applies to all information that is submitted by the lobbyists into the 
Transparency Register.70 The responsibilities put upon lobbyists should be formulated in clear 
rules to avoid uncertainty. According to the WPG responsibilities imposed on the lobbyists 
will be identified in the Code of Conduct.71 The rules and responsibilities should be clearly 
formulated and leave little room for misinterpretation. The rules need to include provisions 
that discourage improper lobbying such as misleading information or concealing which 
interest is being represented.72 3.5.2	   Monitoring	  and	  sanctions	  
Arguments have been made that compliance with responsibilities should be monitored and 
controlled by an agency; which in the best case scenario is independent from both those being 
lobbied and the lobbyists. An independent agency enhances public confidence in the lobbying 
process and strengthens the lobbyists! belief in the regulation which leads to increased 
compliance.73 In order to hold anyone accountable there needs to be some sort of sanction that 
stimulates compliance and motivates rectification were breaches against the responsibilities 
have been made.74 Sanctions suggested by the Commission are encouragements to rectify 
incorrect information in the register and exclusion from the register. There is also the 
possibility of publicly naming lobbyists that fail to comply with the regulation of the 
Transparency Register.75 Although an independent agency responsible for monitoring and 
sanctioning undoubtedly would increase confidence in the system it also sets very high 
demands and is a description of a best-case scenario. In the ETI it is established that 
enforcement should be credible and transparent which is a reasonable standard.76 Lobbyists 
also monitor each other and would not hesitate to complain if another lobbying group were 
breaching the Code of Conduct.77  
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4.1	  	   Lobbying	  regulations	  in	  the	  EU	  	  
Currently the only Member States that have mandatory lobbying regulations are Germany, 
Lithuania, Poland and Hungary.78 The EU is venturing out into fairly unchartered territory by 
creating the Transparency Register, which can be considered a good thing because the 
Member States have not established firm positions about how lobbying regulation should be 
formulated based on national experiences. On the other hand lobbying is a politically sensitive 
topic, there is not much experience of regulation to draw from and there are different opinions 
about the legitimacy of lobbying making it hard to reach consensus.79   
The recently launched Transparency Register is not the first lobbying register created 
on the EU-level. In 1996 the EP established an accreditation system that made registration 
necessary if a lobbyist wanted to enter the EP!s buildings five or more days a year. The 
information available on the website was the name of the lobbyist, employer and the 
represented organisation. In response to the WPG the Commission started up a voluntary 
register called the CONECCS. That register provided information about financing, objectives, 
policy areas and which countries the organisation is active in.80 During the process of 
preparing for the launch of the Transparency Register the Commission!s CONECCS was 
replaced by the Register of Interest Representatives. Prior to the launch of the Transparency 
Register the EP and Commission launched a $new transparency portal page% . That initiative 
was criticized for being nothing more than a page linking to the two separate registers of the 
EP and the Commission without making any improvements on the state of transparency 
regarding lobbying activities within the EU.81 In this context it is also relevant to mention that 
public office holders at the EP and the Commission are bound by Codes of Conduct that 
regulate their behaviour.82 
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4.2	  	   Democratic	  standards	  
The three democratic principles established in chapter 3 are based on the EU!s own 
statements about important principles when regulating lobbying. These chosen democratic 
standards will be used to analyse the Transparency Register and its regulations.  4.2.1	   Information	  about	  lobbyists	  
The Transparency Register provides information regarding the lobbyists! identity such as the 
name of the organisation, contact information, which person is legally responsible for the 
organisation, names of all the individuals that have been granted access badges by the EP, 
number of staff involved in lobbying and, if applicable, the number of members in forms of 
individuals or organisations. The register also points out the organisation!s director or 
managing partner or the person responsible for lobbying activities. Just as in the CONECCS 
the organisations are asked to state in which countries the organisation $carries out 
operations% . Furthermore the organisation is asked to leave information about $affiliations to 
networks%  and $general information that falls within the scope of the register% .83 By searching 
the Transparency Register it is possible to find plentiful data regarding the identity of 
lobbyists. The information is presented clearly on each registrant!s page and a link is provided 
to the organisation!s website. Why lobbyists are asked to supply $general information%  
relevant for the Transparency Register can be questioned. It does not damage the quality of 
the information provided by the register but it also does not add to it unless the lobbyists 
choose to supply information that increases transparency. If $general information%  is to be 
interpreted as an encouragement to lobbyists to add information that they feel is relevant it 
would have been better if the article stated just that. Lobbying organisations are also asked to 
supply information about their $goals/remit%  and $ fields of interest% .84 Fields of interest are 
chosen from a number of set topics and they are easily searchable through the website. 
However, even if a lobbyist is interested in environmental questions it does not necessarily 
mean that that specific lobbyist is actively influencing the latest piece of environmental 
legislation. The goals/remit is written by the lobbyists and therefore has varying levels of 
information.  
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The register asks for financial information regarding all those activities aimed at 
influencing the EU. This includes lobbying directed at the Members States! bodies that 
participate in decision-making at the EU-level.85 The financial numbers will be based on 
accumulated spending for a complete financial year. All the registrants are asked to declare 
any funding received from the EU!s institutions.  Professional consultancies, self-employed 
consultants and law firms have to supply information about the turnover for each client. 
Professional associations, trade associations and in-house lobbyists are asked for an estimate 
of lobbying costs. The remaining organisations; such as think tanks, academic institutions and 
NGOs, are required to provide an overall budget with specification of funding from the main 
sponsors of the organisation. In the case of hired lobbyists their financial disclosures do not 
exempt their clients from supplying information about the money spent, which results in so 
called double counting.86 This likely leads to overestimation of the total funds spent on 
lobbying in the EU. According to the Commission the purpose of the Transparency Register is 
not to provide an estimate of the total spending on lobbying the EU. The aim with the register 
is to provide information about the spending of the individual registrants.87 As stated in 
chapter 3.3.1 the purpose of financial disclosure is to give the citizens and the EU information 
about the financial strength of various lobbyists. This is best done by allowing double 
counting which allows the citizens to look up financial figures for a specific lobbyist without 
needing knowledge of connections between clients and lobbying firms. Nevertheless, 
numbers on the total funds for lobbying in the EU would also be interesting for the citizens. 
Financial disclosure can be criticised of causing a higher amount of work and bureaucracy. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that hired lobbyists keep track of work done for clients 
and that organisations keep track of their spending. 88 In relation to the increased transparency 
achieved by financial disclosure the spending reports should be considered necessary and 
worth the extra effort. 
The Transparency Register is claimed to provide information about who tries to 
influence the decision-making process, interests pursued and the level of resources invested in 
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lobbying.89 Through the register citizens are able to get plentiful information about the 
identity of the lobbyists and their financial spending. In this remark the Transparency Register 
is a success. The register presents information in a way that is easily understandable and with 
clear statements of when the last update was made. But the Transparency Register is 
disappointing when it comes to user-friendliness for citizens. The search engine can be used 
with the criteria of company name, type of organisations, areas of interest for the lobbyists 
and more. However, citizens cannot search the register on the basis of financial disclosures. 
Therefore the only way to find out which lobbyists spend the most, or the least, on EU 
lobbying is to go through each individual registrant!s information.90 It is possible that the 
regular publications of statistics will provide more information about spending in comparison 
with other registrants.91 Even if the reports of statistics compare spending this is a flaw of the 
Transparency Register. The citizens cannot independently use the register to retrieve 
information comparing lobbyist! spending. The public scrutiny would be dependent on 
researchers, journalists or the EU publishing reports on the lobbying costs; unless the citizens 
themselves decide to compare each individual registrant, on 30th October 2011 the number of 
registrants amounted to 2035.92 Naturally the spent amount does not necessarily indicate the 
lobbyist that is the most successful but it is a part of the puzzle. If all the other supplied data is 
searchable there should not be a reason to deny using financial disclosure as a search 
criterion. 4.2.2	   Input	  from	  lobbyists	  
In the register lobbyists are asked to give information about $main legislative proposals 
covered in the preceding year% .93 The information about $main legislative proposals%  are 
covered under the heading $Activities% . The registrants are $advised%  to state legislations that 
they have in some form worked on for the last year and recommended to use the same terms 
as the institutions. The information is presented as $main EU initiatives covered%  and 
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registrants are allowed to freely describe their activities. The guideline on activities is 
supposed to be reviewed later on.94 Based on the information found in the register registrants 
have chosen different approaches. Searching the register you will find everything from 
registrants declaring specific regulations, to general statements and acronyms.95 Depending on 
the information supplied the public could either get an answer to what specific legislations the 
lobbyist has been working on to no more than general information. The guideline should be 
reviewed quickly in order to heighten the quality of the information and actually provide the 
public with information about lobbyists! activities. One clear improvement would be that 
instead of recommending that lobbyists use the terms used by the institutions provide the 
registration page with a list of EU initiatives, thus creating consistency with the terms used. 
Furthermore such a system could be linked to the EU!s webpages about the specific initiative 
so that the public easily can get information about what stage the initiative as at. This would 
create a register that is both effective for the lobbyists to use and a register that supplies 
information that increases transparency and the possibility of public scrutiny. The information 
about activities that does refer to specific legislation is however of limited value. According to 
the article regulating the information about activities the data can be up to a year old.96 This 
means that the Transparency Register cannot guarantee to provide current information about 
legislations being lobbied. A more effective public scrutiny would be achieved by making the 
frequency of reporting activities shorter. This would also benefit the European public debate; 
the citizens are more likely to get involved in the policy-making process if they still have a 
chance to make a difference. 4.2.3	   Comprehensive	  register	  
When trying to establish a comprehensive register the definition of lobbying and lobbyists is 
important, just as with the earlier registers the definition is wide. Lobbying includes direct or 
indirect activities that try and influence the policy-making process. It is not possible to get 
around the definition by using intermediaries such as the media, forums or grass-rot 
initiatives. Activities directed at the Member States or the EU!s institutions, officials or other 
staff is considered as lobbying. Even participation in formal consultations is enclosed by the 
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Transparency Register!s definition of lobbying.97 Activities that do not fall into the scope of 
lobbying are those that can be defined as actions taken in order to provide legal or other 
professional advice, such as mediation or contacts with the authorities to clarify regulation for 
a client. Activities in response to a request from the EU!s institutions or MEP are also 
excluded from the definition as well as actions from social partners, such as employer!s 
organisations, performing their a role assigned to them in the Treaties.98 The definition of 
lobbyist is someone engaging in what the Transparency Register defines as lobbying, 
irrespective of their legal status.99 This definition includes lobbying groups such as 
professional lobbyists, trade associations, in-house lobbyists, law firms, think-tanks, trade 
associations, trade unions, employers! and employees! organisations, public affairs 
consultancies and NGOs.100 Exempt for the definition are churches, political parties and 
municipal, regional or local authorities.101 One of the goals with the Transparency Register is 
to provide the citizens with a register showing the wide range of interests that the EU is 
influenced by and in this sense the definition has been successful in enclosing most of the 
interest influencing the EU.102 With this very wide definition the Transparency Register is 
successful in creating a wide range of interests that could register. 
Just like the Commission proposed the Transparency Register was launched with 
voluntary registration with incentives to motivate registration. As mentioned earlier the EP 
wanted a mandatory register, just like their own register, and the EP kept their mandatory 
approach for lobbyists that want to enter their building five days or more per year.103 The 
issuing of access badges remains with the EP and a registration in the Transparency Register 
is a precondition for being granted an access badge.104 However, the EP!s claim of a 
mandatory register is misleading. A registration in the Transparency Register is only 
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necessary for those lobbyists wishing to physically enter the EP!s buildings. Lobbyists who 
prefer to hold meetings on other locations are not facing demands to register, for them the 
register is voluntary. According to some Commissioners the reality of this $mandatory%  
register!s loophole was that several lobbyists actively influencing the EP were not 
registered.105 Claiming to uphold a mandatory register when the reality is that the regulation 
has a wide-open loophole for those willing to use it can be considered misleading. If the EP 
wants to enhance the citizens! confidence in the policy-making process the institution would 
do best to refrain from using the word mandatory and be clearer about how the lobbyists are 
motivated to register. 
As mentioned in chapter 3.3.3 the Commission decided to enforce two incentives for 
motivating lobbyists to register. Sending out alerts about processes within the EU was 
considered too weak, especially for motivating established lobbying firms in Brussels who 
closely follow the EU. The second incentive was described as $systematically inviting%  
lobbyists and has turned out to be more than an invitation. Any lobbyist wishing to make use 
of the on-line public consultations will have to register if their contribution is going to be 
considered as an input from their organisation. Contributions from unregistered lobbyists will 
be considered as contributions from an individual.106 During the discussion following the ETI 
it was obvious that the participants were divided in those supporting a voluntary register and 
those arguing that it was necessary to introduce a mandatory register in order to ensure a 
comprehensive register.107 The Register of Interest Representatives passed 2 000 registrants 
when the follow-up was done a year after the launch. The Commission!s register experienced 
resistance to registration from especially two lobbying groups. Law firms resisted registration 
claiming that a registration would violate clients! right of confidentiality. The Commission 
stated that the only clients that should be registered are those clients who hire lawyers as 
lobbyists and in the Commission!s experience most of the Brussels law firms participate in 
lobbying for their clients. For the sake of a level playing field the Commission has specified 
how the law firms should distinguish between clients that are protected by confidentiality and 
clients that should be registered in the Transparency Register. Think-tanks were also 
unwilling to register because they consider their input to be academic research rather than 
attempts to influence the EU. According to the Commission some think-tanks offer 
membership with $networking opportunities%  and help their members to $voice their 
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opinions%  and therefore they were participating in lobbying activities. Commission!s register 
was not complete a year after its launch but the Commission still considered it promising 
enough to continue with the voluntary approach.108 The positive outlook on the growing 
number of registrants was not shared by Alter-EU who researched the number of registered 
lobbying consultancies a year after the Commission!s positive statements. According to their 
findings 60% of the lobbying consultancies were not registered in the register two years after 
its launch.109 Alter-EU!s findings focuses on one group meant to register and the result could 
of course be off but it still puts focus on an important topic. What percentage of registered 
lobbyists is sufficient for the Transparency Register to be referred to as a comprehensive 
register that is the one-stop shop for anyone wanting to know who lobbies the EU? For the 
sake of transparency the EP and the Commission should publish estimates about the 
percentage of lobbyists registered. With those numbers the public could decide for themselves 
if the voluntary register can be considered sufficient for supplying them with information 
regarding lobbyists active at EU-level or if they need to complement the Transparency 
Register with other sources. If the lobbyists remain hesitant about registering despite 
incentives from both the EU and the EP the discussion about introducing a mandatory register 
should be brought up again. 4.2.4	   Level	  playing-­‐field	  
As stated in chapter 3.4.1 the Transparency Register and its Code of Conduct should not treat 
lobbyists differently if they are performing the same activities. The registration for the 
registrants should allow a level playing-field.110 The lobbying groups are asked for different 
kinds of information when it comes to the financial disclosure.111 Concerning the financial 
disclosure the Commission has stated that it will ask for relevant figures.112 Asking for 
different sorts of financial information from different organisations does automatically result 
in an unequal treatment of the registrants. If the varying information keeps the registrants at 
an equal amount of information disclosure and transparency the differences would be 
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motivated. When discussing the varying information it is important to remember that the 
organisations themselves choose type of organisation when registering and thereby what 
information they are asked for.113 Here peer review will likely play an important role, 
especially among the established lobbying groups on EU-level. Any questionable 
categorisation will probably be questioned by other groups. As an example NGOs today are 
not just NGOs since an organisation is under constant development and can have traits that 
make them more difficult to categorise.114  But there still is a risk that less-known groups or 
groups in the gray-zone between to different groups can find advantages from the different 
information requirements. If trouble arises it is likely that attention will be called to the 
problem. Nonetheless it would be beneficial for the reputation of the register to proactively 
establish guidelines for how the registrants choose their category.  
Concerns for a level playing-field were raised in the development of the 
Transparency Register within the different categories. Initially the two highest brackets for 
turnovers were $&  950 000-& 1 000 000%  and $>&  1 000 000% . These brackets meant that the 
organisations with a lower turnover were giving more specific information than the 
organisations with the highest turnover. The Commission stated that $ the list of ranges should 
be extended beyond the current limit of & 1 000 000% . This would increase the chances of a 
level playing-field for the registrants with a large turnover.115 Since the Transparency Register 
has paid attention to the range of brackets before it should be assumed that the range of the 
brackets will be increased if any registrants are within the highest bracket.116 4.2.5	   Responsibilities	  and	  rules	  
When registering the lobbyists agree to act in compliance with the Code of Conduct and 
guarantee that the information provided by them in the Transparency Register is correct.117 
According to the Code of Conduct the lobbyists are responsible for ensuring that the 
information provided to the Transparency Register and the contributions made during 
activities that falls within the scope of the register is $complete, up-to-date and not 
misleading% . The provision also acknowledges that the registrants cannot guarantee this so 
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gives room for honest mistake with the formulation $ to the best of their knowledge% .118 
However, the registrants only have to update their information once a year. The registrants are 
urged to update the information if they feel that there have been any $significant%  changes. 
Failure to update the information once a year will eventually lead to the registrant!s removal 
from the register.119 The minimum review of the registrants! information is enough for 
registrants that do not experience any big changes within their organisation or line of 
business. Since it is only a recommendation to update the information when significant 
changes occur and the changes are not exemplified it is possible that information about 
changes will not be available for the public and other lobbyists until a year after. This of 
course decreases the value of the information from the Transparency Register. It would not be 
unreasonable to ask the registrants to review their information two or three times a year this 
could be done by an automatic reminder that asks the registrant to validate that the 
information on the register is still correct. 
The Code of Conduct also establishes that the lobbyists should respect the rules 
applicable to EU officials and staff and not try to induce them to break these rules, always 
identify themselves and the interest they represent and inform interests they represent of the 
rules in the Code of Conduct.120 The Code of Conduct is considered to be a minimum 
standard of behaviour. Some of the provisions have been criticised for being either too broad 
or impossible to trace.121 This could easily be improved by exemplifying behaviours that fall 
within the scope of the provision, either through guidelines or annexes to the Code of 
Conduct. It is important that the rules in the Code of Conduct are capable to use for 
sanctioning behaviour that is considered improper. If a breach of the Code of Conduct would 
go unsanctioned due to a weak formulation of the rules it would likely damage the confidence 
in the Transparency Register. 
The minimum standards for behaviour are chosen because the EU wants the 
lobbyists to develop Codes of Conduct and contribute to pushing the improvement of 
standards forward.122 The Commission has stated that there are positive signs of improving 
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ethical standards. Some organisations are committed to standards that go beyond the Code of 
Conduct and other registrants provide information that is not required.123 The stimulation of a 
development of standards among organisations lobbying the EU is commendable. It increases 
awareness of legitimate lobbying activities, enhances confidence in the policy-making process 
and compliance of the Transparency Register should rise. But relying too much on the 
lobbying organisations ability to develop Codes of Conduct is not wise. The EU initiated 
discussions about Codes of Conduct in 1992 which did result in new codes. However the 
codes were coherent with the EU!s minimum standards and were only applied to consultants, 
leaving a large amount of the lobbyists unaffected by the standards.124  4.2.6	   Monitoring	  and	  sanctions	  
Registered lobbyists have accepted that complaints will be handled according to the rules in 
the Code of Conduct. The lobbyists accept any measures determined on the basis of them not 
complying with or infringing on the Code of Conduct.125 Responsible for monitoring and 
sanctioning the system is the Joint Transparency Register Secretariat. The Secretariat consists 
of officials from both the Commission and the EP.126 The monitoring will be based on 
complaints that can be filed by anyone about possible breaches of the Code of Conduct and 
random monitoring performed by the Secretariat. However, complaints filed will not be 
considered if they are anonymous and it is $ in principle%  necessary to provide some sort of 
proof supporting the complaint.127 If a complaint is deemed inadmissible the complainant will 
be informed by the Secretariat!s decision and reasons for not pursuing the complaint.128 Any 
measure deemed necessary to address incompliance with the Transparency Register!s 
regulations will be preceded by an investigation made by the Secretariat. The concerned 
registrant will be informed about the investigation and asks the registrant to submit a response 
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to the complaint. The Secretariat also has the possibility to hear the complainant or the 
registrant if necessary.129 Possible sanctions ranges from temporary suspensions to removal 
from the register which is combined with a prohibition to register for another one or two 
years.130 The sanctions may also be made public on the Transparency Register!s website.131 
The ETI established that enforcement of the Transparency Register should be credible and 
transparent which is a reasonable standard.132 During the development of the Transparency 
Register the Commission made it clear that it did not believe in leaving enforcement to the 
lobbyists because of their varying opinions and difficulties to reach consensus. According to 
the Commission they would always be responsible for their interactions with lobbying groups 
which would make it difficult to outsource the monitoring.133 The monitoring and sanctioning 
system seems to be well composed with contacts with both complainants and registrants 
throughout the complaint process. The Secretariat also has a wide range of sanctions to 
choose from which makes it possible to adapt the measures to the situation. If a registrant 
needs extra time to update information and it is reasonable, then it is reasonable that they can 
be granted extra time.134 The benefit of the Secretariat consisting of officials from the EP and 
the Commission is that they know how lobbying is performed and are familiar with the EU 
system. They are unlikely to make mistakes because of misconceptions or lack of knowledge. 
On the other hand they could be criticised for being impartial. The EP and the Commission 
wants the Transparency Register to be a success. Therefore they might refrain from harsher 
sanctions and posting eventual sanctions on the webpage. Besides that the Secretariat might 
be faced with complaints that concern improper behaviour from a colleague which is a 
delicate situation. This critique could be fuelled by the fact that it is unlikely that the public 
will receive information about sanctions. Honest mistakes that are sanctioned would cause the 
registrants negative publicity so the Secretariat will likely only post sanctions on the website 
that are clear violations. Although this is good for the registrants since they should have some 
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room for mistakes, especially for minor faults in the beginning, the public will receive little 
information about the monitoring and sanctioning system. The lack of transparency might 
cause lower confidence in the enforcement system. To outsource the monitoring and 
sanctioning seems to be excessive but the introduction from members outside of the EP and 
the Commission could be beneficial for the system. Another alternative would be to increase 
the level of transparency into the complaints system but that might risk damaging registrants 
who have only made minor mistakes. 
Parallel to the register!s monitoring of the compliance of the Transparency Register!s 
regulations is monitoring from peers, media and the public. Established lobbyists have an 
interest in monitoring each other to make sure that no groups abuse the system, get unfair 
advantages or creates scandals. It is believed that established and professional groups have 
more to lose by becoming scandals and therefore behave increasingly correct. It is likely that 
groups with resources enough to keep track of their opponents will provide a useful additional 
monitoring system. The media at EU-level is currently fairly underdeveloped and might not 
be able to provide effective monitoring of the lobbyists.135 Weaker groups could use the 
Transparency Register but the success of monitoring through the register will be dependent on 
the quality of the information and how frequently the register is updated. As discussed in 
chapter 4.2.5 the information on registrants can be up to a year old which would not provide 
useful information for monitoring. 
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5.1	  	   Lobbying	  regulations	  in	  the	  USA	  
This brief chapter on the USA lobbying regulations is an introduction to the regulation of the 
world!s largest centre for lobbying when it comes to diversity and number of lobbyists.136 
Despite declining numbers of lobbying firms lobbying spending at federal level reached an 
all-time high in 2010 of $3.51 billion spent in the US.137 The comparison between the EU!s 
and the USA!s regulations should be seen as a basic comparison between the two regulations 
and not a complete comparative analysis. 
As mentioned in chapter 1.4 the US first lobbying regulation on state level was 
introduced in 1935. The Public Utilities Holding Company Act and the following legislations, 
Merchant Marine Act and Foreign Agents Registration Act, were all laws focusing on specific 
types of lobbyists. The legislations were the result of scandals and rising concerns about 
lobbyists in specific industries. The first general lobbying regulation was passed in 1946 with 
the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. The law was seen as a failure since it only covered 
the Congress, the legislation was not enforced properly and the financial disclosure was 
ineffective. Still the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act lasted for nearly fifty years until it 
was replaced by the current law.138 
The current federal regulation the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) was enacted in 
1995 and adopted unanimously in the House. One of the improvements was a wider definition 
of lobbyists; the former legislation only regulated lobbyists hired by others to influence the 
Congress.139 Following lobbying scandals, amongst other things suspicions of undue 
influence for certain groups, the legislation was amended in 2007 with the Honest Leadership 
and Open Government Act (HLOGA). The focus for the amendment was to give more 
detailed information about activities of paid lobbyists, restriction on offering and receiving 
gifts, restrictions on the revolving door, greater transparency in the legislative process and 
more.140 The HLOGA was adopted in order to restore confidence in the policy-making 
process. The focus was to increase fairness of the process and convince the citizens of the 
integrity of the US institutions. The importance of making sure that decision-makers are not 
isolated from the views and concerns of the society was emphasized.141 
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5.2	  	   Comparison	  with	  US	  regulation	  
Even though the reasons for implementing lobbying regulation in the US and the EU are 
strikingly similar it is important to remember that regulation cannot be easily transferred from 
one system to another, since regulation often is adjusted to that system!s specific needs.142 It 
is therefore necessary to be careful when comparing two different regulations, especially since 
the EU is basically a voluntary system and the USA has a mandatory system. 5.3.1	   Information	  about	  lobbyists	  
As mentioned above in chapter 5.1 the LDA introduced a wider definition of lobbyists. The 
former Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act was only applicable to hired lobbyists influencing 
the Congress.143 Lobbying is protected by the First Amendment which states that the citizens 
have a right to assemble and $petition the Government for a redress of grievances%  (The 
Constitution of the United States, first amendment). US lobbying regulation needs to respect 
freedom of speech and association. Therefore the regulations are limited to disclosure and 
transparency, restrictions or prohibitions would violate the citizens! rights. The less 
interfering approaches used can however also go too far but cannot be deemed 
unconstitutional in general, instead the provisions have to be tried for each separate situation 
(United States vs Harriss).144 This reasoning is similar to the arguments made in chapter 3.4 
that the EU!s positive approach to lobbying is connected to the citizens! right to participate in 
democratic life. 
 US lobbyists are asked to provide information similar to the ones in the EU. 
They have to provide data on their identity, funding, clients and the names of every employee 
that acts or is expected to act as a lobbyist (LDA, Sec 4.b). The HLOGA introduced demands 
that lobbyists who have held $executive or legislative branch positions%  the last twenty years 
have to disclose this information.145 The LDA only demanded disclosure on positions held 
two years earlier (LDA, Sec 4.b.6). This is in place partly to monitor what is referred to as the 
#revolving door! where former officials become lobbyists.146 In the Transparency Register!s 
Code of Conduct it is stated that lobbyists who hire former EU officials or staff have to 
respect that they are bound by rules and confidentiality agreements. There is no requirement 
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to supply information about the hiring in the register.147 The concerns about #revolving doors! 
is that former staffers have connections that give them unfair advantaged, there is also a slight 
unsettling feeling if politicians leave office to join firms that have benefited from proposals 
that the politician has supported. The issue of the #revolving door! is acknowledged at EU-
level. As an example former Commissioners are forbidden to lobby the Commission or 
former colleagues for a period of 18 months on matters which belonged to their portfolio.148  
Considering that the #revolving door!-regulation in the EU is criticised for being too weak, it 
would be beneficial for transparency if the register stated lobbyists that are former EU 
officials or staffers.149 In comparison between non-existent information and information that 
goes back 20 years it does not seem like an unreasonable request. 
In the US lobbying firms file a separate registration for each individual client. If the 
assignment from a client does not bring in revenue of over $3 000 during a quarterly period 
the firm does not have to report the client. There are other financial limits such as the total 
expenses for in-house lobbyists that have to be reached before a filing is necessary.150 This 
reporting system differs from the Transparency Register. The amount of information is 
actually increased in the Transparency Register because there is no lower limit on how much 
needs to be sent or brought in as profit. The solution in the US is likely appropriate for a 
register consisting of hired lobbyists rather than the Transparency Register that has varying 
organisations.  5.3.2	   Input	  from	  lobbyists	  
The requirements for US lobbyists regarding their input are very different from the EU!s 
demands. The lobbyists supply information about their lobbying activities four times a year. 
The lobbying activities are divided into general areas under which the lobbyists declare which 
specific issues they have lobbied including to the $maximum extent practicable%  a list of bill 
numbers or references. Including data about House of Congress or Federal agencies contacted 
during the lobbying (LDA, Sec 5.a-b, and HLOGA, Sec 201.a). This is a dramatic increase of 
information compared to the inconsequent reporting that currently is seen in the Transparency 
Register. As suggested in chapter 4.2.2 transparency would be improved if the lobbyists 
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clearly stated EU initiatives lobbied. The US solution is a concrete example of a working 
system of supplying information on lobbying activities. 5.3.3	   Comprehensive	  register	  
As mentioned in chapter 4.2.3 one of the purposes of the Transparency Register is to establish 
a comprehensive register. Compared to the EU!s definition of lobbyists it is obvious that the 
LDA has a narrower definition. Only so called professional or hired lobbyists are defined as 
lobbyists by the legislation. The lobbyist has to be hired for more than one $ lobbying contact%  
and be compensated for the assignment. But that the individual!s lobbying activities have to 
amount to 20% or more of the services provided to a specific client over a three month period 
(LDA, Sec 3.10, and HLOGA Sec 201.b.1).151 That means that individuals whose majority of 
assignments are not lobbying activities are not considered as lobbyists. The Transparency 
Register!s definition states that anyone, no matter their legal status, involved in activities 
classified as lobbying is a lobbyist.152 For the purpose of the register to provide the public 
with a comprehensive register the EU!s definition is preferable. When it comes to the 
definition of lobbying the US regulation presents a wide definition similar to the EU!s 
definition. Lobbying contacts are defined as written or oral communication aimed at 
influencing federal legislation, federal rules or even the position of the United States 
Government (LDA, Sec 3.8.A). The definition also has exemptions and these are wider than 
the exemptions in the Transparency Register. The exemption of statements $made in a speech, 
article, publication or other material%  is an example of the protection of freedom of speech 
(LDA, Sec 3.8.B).  The use of the media as an intermediary is specifically mentioned in the 
Transparency Register as an example of lobbying activity.153 Since public opinion can 
influence the policy-making process the EU!s wider definition once again contributes to a 
more comprehensive register compared to the US definition.  5.3.4	   Level	  playing-­‐field	  
Discussing a level playing-field for the lobbyists against the background of the US regulation 
is complicated because it is focused on what can be described as a professional lobbying 
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industry. For those lobbyists falling within the scope of the regulation the same rules apply. 
The only difference is that some reports are not triggered due to low amounts of either 
expenses or income (LDA, Sec. 4.a.). One might argue that this makes the lobbyists with 
lower financial figures less transparent. At the same time it is important to remember that the 
US regulations are highly demanding to fulfil. Even to the extent of not having enough time to 
update the information correctly and a lot of resources have to be put into complying with the 
regulations.154 Therefore it would be unreasonable not to have a lower financial limit as this 
would otherwise overburden smaller lobbying firms.   5.3.5	   Responsibilities	  and	  rules	  
The HLOGA increased the frequency of reporting for certain information from two to four 
times a year (HLOGA, Sec. 201). Lobbyists have to file quarterly reports of information 
regarding lobbying activities and semi-annual reports for certain contributions (LDA, Sec. 5.a, 
and HLOGA, Sec. 203.a). The high frequency of updates and new reports mean that it is 
possible for the US register to be used as a monitoring device for the public, other lobbyists 
and politicians. The register of the filings is not especially user-friendly but there are excellent 
websites providing information on US lobbying.155 The US regulation shows that it is not 
unreasonable to increase the reporting frequency for the Transparency Register to more than 
once a year. The suggestion of more frequent reporting mentioned in chapter 4.2.5, especially 
for important information such as EU initiatives that the lobbyist has tried to influence, would 
enhance the use of the Transparency Register. The US regulations do not have a Code of 
Conduct; this is instead supplied by the American League of Lobbyists! Code of Ethics. 
According to an EU report that code is equivalent to the EU!s Codes but more detailed.156 
Besides this Code of Ethics the lobbyists are bound to state the name of their client and 
whether or not they are registered when the person they are talking to asks (LDA, Sec. 14.a). 
The difference is that the EU lobbyists have to supply all the information that can be found in 
the US register directly.157   5.3.6	   Monitoring	  and	  sanctioning	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One of the proposed improvements with the LDA was to establish an enforcement agency, but 
the proposition was removed after defeat in the House.158 The Secretary of the Senate and the 
Clerk of the House of Representatives are responsible for supplying support to the registrants, 
monitoring and notifying any registrant of non-compliance. If a registrant does not reply to 
the non-compliance of the act the United States of Attorney for District of Columbia is 
notified (LDA, Sec. 6). For knowingly not complying with the act or failing to correct a filing 
the lobbyist can be fined with up to $50 000 (LDA, Sec. 7). There is no removal from the 
register or ban from the register because that would violate the citizens! rights established by 
the first amendment of the US Constitution. The use of fines would not be advisable for the 
Transparency Register since it is a voluntary register and registrants might decide not to 
register to avoid the risk of fines. 
There are obviously different approaches taken by the US and the EU. The reason the 
US has a more detailed and robust systems of regulation have been speculated to be the 
country!s long history of lobbying and the openness surrounding their participation. Lobbying 
is a professionalised industry in the US and the policy-making process is scrutinized by a 
critical press. The fact is that a lot of the US regulation has come after various scandals have 
been uncovered.159 With the amount of updated information available in the US register it 
should come as no surprise that the register is more effective as a monitoring system for the 
public and media than the Transparency Register.   
                                               
158 Chari et al, Regulating lobbying: a global comparison, page 23. 
159 Chari et al, Regulating lobbying: a global comparison, pages 112-113.  
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6.1	  	   Conclusion	  
The recently launched Transparency Register is one of the measures meant to improve the 
EU!s transparency, level of participation and accountability. Through several EU initiatives, 
such as the WPG and the ETI, a searchable register has taken form that is user-friendly. 
Today anyone wanting to learn more about the registered EU lobbyists can search information 
on the basis of name, interest area or type of organisation. The definitions of both lobbyists 
and lobbying are wide and thus enhance the possibility of reaching the EU!s goal of a 
comprehensive register. 
Concerning the EU!s promise to make monitoring of lobbying activities possible, the 
promise is not close to being fulfilled. The lobbyists are currently registering everything from 
concrete information about EU initiatives lobbied to general statements about their business 
and the statements can be up to a year old when posted. This prevents the public from 
effectively monitoring the lobbyists! activities. The provisions regarding the statements on 
lobbying activities need to be reformulated to guarantee relevant information. In line with the 
US regulations the frequency of reporting should be increased for important information, such 
as lobbying activities, to help stimulate a public debate. Unfortunately the financial 
information provided by the lobbyists is currently not searchable in the register. This is 
disappointing considering the amount of effort put into providing clear rules and guidelines 
for financial disclosures, a feeling that is likely shared by both the citizens and the lobbyists 
who have put effort into providing correct figures. The Transparency Register can best be 
described as a voluntary register with incentives. Despite several organisations urging for a 
mandatory register for the sake of transparency and for creating a truly comprehensive 
register, the Commission has remained positive to the voluntary solution. The basis for a 
debate on the success of the voluntary register should be an estimation of the percentage of 
lobbyists registered. This way it will be clear if the voluntary approach is working and 
citizens can make their own decision about whether or not the Transparency Register supplies 
satisfying information about who is lobbying the EU. 
The Transparency Register is currently not enough to ensure democratically sound 
lobbying within the EU. But it is a first step that hopefully is followed by more.  
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